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Cultural critics have sought to define the term posthuman1 as primarily 
a condition that does away with hierarchical forms of power and control. 
It recognizes a transformation of the human species into a subject posi-
tion that moves from an oppositional politics of segregating the human 
“self ” from the “other” to one of acknowledging the “other” as part of 
the human “self.” 2 With the advent of the posthuman condition comes 
the need to re-define human rights in a posthuman context. Octavia 
Butler’s science fiction novel Adulthood Rites3 introduces us to Oankali, 
gene-trading aliens who travel through space. They intercept and save 
the human species that is dying in a world ravaged by nuclear war. The 
Oankali mission of salvation has a hidden agenda,4 though: whoever opts 
to be saved needs to forgo the right to reproduce. Reproduction, in this 
new world where human beings are a salvaged species and not the pre-
dominant one, is on the terms laid out by the Oankali aliens. The terms 
of Oankali reproduction that start off with genetic modifications of the 
human Lilith, the Oankali nominated progenitor of the posthuman in 
Dawn, enforces the birth of a hybrid—a human-alien construct, Akin, 
who is related to both humans and aliens, the posthuman other. Built 
on a “postcolonial” definition of a “mimic man,”5 a product of what Bart 
Simon and Jill Didur call “critical posthumanism,”6 who sees the other 
in the self, Akin modulates and modifies his sense of agency and choice 
as he contends with complex political and ethical issues. Deployed as an 
Oankali informer among humans, Akin ultimately emerges as the savior, 
a spokesperson for the human species who adroitly balances contradic-
tory roles in a culture seemingly “colonial” in its intent. 
As gene-trading aliens, the Oankali evoke the European traders 
when they made their initial forays into establishing a colonial empire 
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(Goss and Riquelme 448). They seem to disguise their intent, the en-
forcement of a total denial of human reproductive rights, in a rhet-
oric of altruism, salvation, and apparent choice. Read one way, this 
mission of salvation recalls the civilizing mission of colonizers replete 
with demeaning assumptions that formed the heart of “civilizing” 
campaigns. And yet the intent behind the Oankali genetic trade is one 
of producing a “different” species for the future7 and they promise “a 
utopian collective,” for after all the Oankali seek and embrace differ-
ence. The text denies an easy reading between categorized knowledge 
of oppressive Oankali and victimized humans (Miller 339). It brings 
in “ambivalences within these definitions of power … mapped by 
the structures of control and interdependency which are in turn sub-
ject to the demands of compromise and survival” (Boulter 176–77). 
Confronted with this complex situation, Akin remains undecided 
about the Oankali because he is uncertain whether they are progeni-
tors of an altruistic symbiotic mode that ensures human survival or 
predators of an egoistic discourse that intends to bring about human 
extinction. His divided loyalties bring on further complications when 
Akin, though nurtured by the Oankali as a “mimic man” becomes not 
an “idea-driven puppet who do[es] only what their creators think the 
plot requires” but begins to take on a life of his own (Raffel 457). He 
requires extraordinary finesse to reach his goal of convincing the ap-
parent “colonizer”8 aliens to restore reproductive rights to humans, 
who by nature are discriminatory and violent. With rare cognitive 
skills, Akin embraces a transformative potential nurtured by a sense of 
intimacy and complicity that refutes discourses of hierarchical power 
and control essential to the imperialistic imperative. It enables him 
to communicate, adjust and adapt to the changing dynamics of the 
aliens and humans. In his flexibility, Akin re-writes his role. He brings 
in a rare complexity to definitions of postcolonial difference and hy-
bridity. It is my contention that this posthuman other, a cross-cul-
tural product, builds on the “both/and”9 politics of species and keeps 
evolving as he tackles critical situations. He remains an identity-in-
the-making,10 who manipulates every situation even as he justifies his 
moves.
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II.
The posthuman other, in its human–alien construct goes back to Donna 
Haraway’s “cyborg,”11 the bio-technological modification of man and 
machine that is “a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fic-
tion” (Simians 149). As “social reality” is based on “lived experience,” the 
cyborg (for Haraway also a metaphor for women of colour) breeds on 
change, a change that in its flexibility and adaptability makes a radical 
statement in its bid to survive (Simians 149). Cyborgs remain perma-
nently “committed to partiality, irony, intimacy, and perversity” and in 
their flexible and permeable identity politics look at a subjectivity that 
refuses both gender fixations as well as any political affinity (Simians 
151). In their cyborgian existence, they become potent signifiers who 
exemplify the constructedness of nature as “a crucial cultural process 
for people who need and hope to live in a world less riddled by the 
dominations of race, colonialism, class, gender, and sexuality” (Simians 
2). Haraway’s “cyborg” brings up issues of technological infiltration and 
re-shaping of nature in its aftermath that includes a virtual induction 
of technology into nature to create a novel, autonomously functioning 
organic identity. The cognitive skills of this posthuman other partake 
of both realms of its existence—human and technological—as it moves 
into a new phase of its evolution.12 Especially interesting in this evolved 
metaphor of humanity is the role of human choice and of political and 
ethical questions such choices may or would entail. The product of a 
fusion between humans and non-humans, animals and/or machines, 
the posthuman deals with permeations of human and non-human phys-
ical and mental boundaries. As physical boundaries collapse and require 
re-alignment, on the level of mental capabilities the posthuman other 
brings on a unique epistemological discourse scripted on “a greater inti-
macy and complicity with environment and artifact, a true interdepend-
ence in which human nature is no longer characterized through mastery 
and exclusion of its designated others” (Graham, “Post/Human” 13).
 These hybrid creatures are not products of mechanical grafting; in 
their births they defy all forms of purity. They demarcate the next phase 
of human evolution—a type of Homi Bhabha’s “mimic man” whose 
semblance of mimicry becomes a potent site of negotiation and resist-
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ance molded by his own needs.13 Part of the “critical posthumanism” 
type of this “mimic man” in his transformative abilities questions the 
essential boundaries of human nature as he celebrates the “borderland” 
identity of the “human and unhuman collectives” (Haraway, “Promises” 
328). He analytically seeks to critique the “fault-lines … of discursive 
technologies … [as he] realize[s] the power of technologies [that] re-
shape our worlds and … our very selves [stipulating that it] is a matter 
of human agency and choice rather than technological inevitability” 
(Graham, “Post/Human” 18–19). Augmenting the posthuman other 
that admits residence in the liminal zone demarcated between an ad-
vocate and an opponent, where questions of agency and choice become 
important, is also a sense of spirituality. And yet, I would like to differ 
with D. F. Noble when he situates the inspiration of the posthuman “in 
an enduring, other-worldly quest for transcendence and salvation”14 (3).
 In Butler’s Adulthood Rites these quests, though lasting in intent and 
admittedly driven by a sense of salvation, are not “other-worldly” as 
Noble points out. In fact, these posthuman others, I feel, often seek 
validation in a “this-worldly” context drawing from an extended web of 
relatedness to other human and nonhuman beings. In “Frankensteins 
and Cyborgs: Visions of the Global Future in an Age of Technology,” 
Elaine Graham points out that these posthuman others are “reflexive 
phenomena … possessing the capacity to shape, in turn, the environ-
ments and cultures we inhabit” (“Frankensteins” 43). Interactiveness 
and relational dynamics form the crux of this posthuman world, a 
world where hybridity demands complicity of component cultures. 
Thus in their posthuman identity, these others not only eschew “onto-
logical purity” but breed on “multiple allegiances, contingent identities 
and nomadic sensibilities” that offer novel insights into what it means 
to be posthuman and thereby open up new possibilities (Graham, 
Representations 234).
III.
This “process of emergence” of the posthuman that aims to become “a 
potential antidote to destructive hierarchical attitudes and behavior” 
traverses an interesting trajectory in Butler’s trilogy Xenogenesis (Goss 
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and Riquelme 435). The genesis of the “xeno” (the stranger, the other) 
15 begins in the first book of the trilogy, Dawn. As the book introduces 
the reader to the human Lilith Iyapo, now genetically modified by the 
alien Oankalis, designated to be the mother of the human-Oankali con-
struct, it ushers in a dawn of the posthuman other. The narrative begins 
with the trope of re-birth, a coming into life validated by a sense of relief 
conveyed by the exclamation mark:
  Alive!
  Still alive.
  Alive … again. (9)
The Oankali relief speaks of Lilith’s “awakening” from a death-like state 
of suspended animation, a state in which her genetic composition has 
been changed. Morphed into this state by the Oankalis, Lilith is de-
ployed by the aliens to persuade the dissenting humans to comply with 
the Oankali option of controlled human reproduction. She is told this 
is the only viable way for human survival.
 Modeled in the mold of the Oankalis, by way of her genetic modifica-
tions, Lilith is therefore human and alien. She is the “enabler”16essential 
to both Oankali and human survival. The Oankali need her to convince 
humans to comply with their agenda. The humans need her too, as 
they are dependent on her for their survival in Oankali land. Situated 
on this fulcrum of the human/alien equation, Lilith qualifies as the first 
Bhabhian “mimic man” who transcends the programmed entity to a 
borderland identity that enables her to understand the Oankali intent 
and yet retain her humanity. Her perception of the organic entity of the 
ship leads her to understand the relational dynamics that flow through 
the ship, as Jdahya explains, “Flesh. More like mine than like yours. 
Different from mine, too, though. It’s … the ship” (33). An active par-
ticipant in the symbiotic bonding between humans, animals, plants, 
and machines, Lilith is essential for human survival. Her realization of 
this theory of relatedness makes her an intermediary whose philosophy 
of salvation, rooted in a “this-worldly” context, advises fellow humans 
to interact and assimilate with the Oankalis, if only to learn their colo-
nizing mind-frame in order to survive their dominance.17 And yet even 
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as she acknowledges the human part of her self, she rationalizes that if 
the “Human Contradiction” (a combination of intelligence and a hi-
erarchical tendency that desires to control and destroy) is not geneti-
cally resolved then humans would destroy themselves and as a species be 
eradicated forever. Lilith is only the first stage, the transformed entity 
that anticipates her child, the posthuman Akin, a genetically mutated 
“construct.”
 Akin’s rite of passage from birth to adulthood is based on a relational 
dynamic where “self ” is defined human and alien in his “posthuman” 
being. The third-person voice that registers the “birth” of the posthu-
man other recalls “his stay in the womb.” The remembrance is fraught 
with a dawning awareness of “sounds and tastes … [that] meant nothing 
to him, but he remembered them. When they recurred, he noticed.”
When something touched him, he knew it to be a new thing—
a new experience. The touch was first startling, then comfort-
ing. It penetrated his flesh painlessly and calmed him. When 
it withdrew, he felt bereft, alone for the first time. When it re-
turned he was pleased—another new sensation. When he had 
experienced a few of these withdrawals and returns, he learned 
anticipation. (251)
A “startling” touch that becomes “comforting” even as it “calms” him 
initiates a sense of desired bonding and leaves behind a strong void in 
its withdrawal as “he felt bereft, alone for the first time.” The desola-
tion etched into loneliness indicates an anticipation to connect with 
“others,” a connection that seeks fulfillment in a sense of “wholeness,” 
one easily understandable by the diversity of his multiple parenthood. 
His two sets of parents—human and Oankali—open up the traditional 
one set parenthood by insisting on a sense of polyvalence that works 
across the coupling of different species. Akin’s multi-parenting accords 
equal status to both sets of parents, diluting in the process any sense of 
inherent hierarchy that seeks to segregate and ostracize the other. By 
seeking to prioritize this new sense of relationality and interconnected-
ness, Butler further introduces the ooloi, a subadult Oankali, essential to 
mating and reproduction, with ambiguous if variable gender, a facilita-
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tor who bridges and yet monitors the coitus of the two species, to form 
a triadic arrangement. 
 In her essay for the 2001 United Nations Racism Conference, Octavia 
Butler wrote that she wanted to write about a “civilization in which 
people somehow felt—that is, they shared—all the pain and all the 
pleasure they caused one another.” “The point,” she said, “was to create, 
in fiction at least … a world in which people were inclined … to accept 
one another’s differences” (“A World without Racism”). Butler’s desire 
is embodied in Akin; his body a site in which opposing differencialities 
merge and collapse to make him realize that “he was also part of the 
people who touched him—that within them, he could find fragments 
of himself ” (253). Despite these realizations, the mergings evident in 
Akin’s physical transformations and mental agility are never absolute. 
His own psyche becomes a battleground for understanding, as well as 
the impetus and agency for individual thinking that ultimately tran-
spires to make him an “intra-species” instrument of salvation (Tucker 
168). His dual allegiance leads to the personal struggles that Akin later 
faces as he tries to negotiate between the two species. As the posthuman 
other, he builds on this relatedness, taking on as his life’s mission the 
restoration of the human right to reproduce. 
 Any discussion on rights and privileges easily recalls its ties to hu-
manism and the “speciesist structure of subjectivization” that situates 
the concept of rights as a natural human prerogative built on “an over-
arching ‘logic of domination’—all compressed in what Derrida’s recent 
work [‘Eating Well’] calls carnophallogocentrism” (Wolfe 8). With the 
advent of liberalization of humanist concepts came the idea of “empty-
ing of the category of the subject” (Wolfe 8). In other words, any form 
of subjectivity was to be understood regardless of any race, gender, class 
or species categorization. However, as Wolfe points out, “the category 
of the subject was formally empty in the liberal tradition, it remained 
materially full of asymmetries and inequalities in the social sphere” ( 8). 
Posthuman subjectivity, it was contended, would displace the sense of a 
liberal humanist self. It is my contention that Akin, in his bid to restore 
the reproductive rights of humans, re-writes traits of the liberal human-
ist subject into his posthuman self; he initiates “a dynamic partnership 
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between humans and intelligent machines [read aliens/Oankali] [that] 
replace the liberal humanist subject’s manifest destiny to dominate and 
control nature” (Hayles 288). When Akin promises freedom and a res-
toration of human rights, we see a re-writing of humanist, even lib-
eral humanist notions on the question of rights. Instead of the humans 
claiming their rights, it is the posthuman Akin, who decides to retrieve 
the human right to reproduction. What Akin argues for is a chance for 
humans to continue their genetic stock before their contact with the 
Oankalis. As the Oankali had kept a part of their species intact in its 
purity, with no mixing of human genes, Akin calls for a similar and 
equal “right” to be restored to the humans. 
 Part of the colonial agenda was to manage sexual relationships that 
included not only the colonized but the colonizer as well as the hybrid 
or mixed race product of such a union. Interestingly, this latter cat-
egory included “men who had ‘gone native’ or simply veered off cul-
tural course, of European children too taken with local foods, too versed 
in local knowledge” (Stoler 2). The management of sexuality between 
these groups was critical as they were the charged sites in which racial 
categories were redefined. They became primary concerns of the colo-
nial policy in their intricate and complex existences. On the one hand, 
the colonizers needed to secure borders and avoid contagion in their 
endeavor to retain sexual purity. Yet, on the other hand, heterosexual 
union was an imperative for which they accepted (or even deliberately 
ignored) liaisons with coloured women.18 Naturally the domestic arena 
where such contact was easy became a primary focus of colonial ad-
ministration that fretted over “affective ties” that produced “cultural 
defections … the instabilities and vulnerabilities of colonial regimes” 
(Stoler 7, 10). So Akin in the affective ties he creates in his sojourn 
with the human resisters, emerges as a complex troubled site for the 
Oankalis. The “chromatic crafting”19 of Akin is further problematized 
as we realize that Oankali, despite their colonizing traits, have mitigat-
ing qualities. The human resisters, again, cannot be sympathized with 
completely as helpless victims because of their discriminatory behaviour 
towards difference as well as a hierarchical, violent mind frame that does 
not even stop at self-destruction. Playing along the narrative, however, 
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are nuanced definitions that contribute to the ambiguity of the text. 
For example, when Sherryl Vint points out that despite Butler’s critical 
attitude towards humans, she never endorses the “genetic essentialism 
perspective of the Oankali” because she never rules out the “possibility 
that genetic information could be used in socially repressive ways” (68, 
77). Akin then, by virtue of his birth and his sentimental allegiance, 
portrays “the ‘polyvalent mobility’ of racial discourse and what might be 
gained by attending to racial discourses as historical processes of rupture 
and recuperation” (Stoler 19).
 In African communities the infant “is believed to have been com-
missioned to come to the world and accomplish a particular mission or 
project, and often ha[d] a great message to deliver” (Ampim). In fact 
the infant’s name is a reflection of the infant’s personality or of his life 
mission. Akin’s name foreshadows and presages his purpose. His name 
has multiple meanings but the meanings all work symbiotically. A “kin” 
to Oankalis and humans, Akin is “akin” (not “a-kin” to any one species). 
By a phonetic extension of his name “ah-keen” signifies a loud, wailing 
lament for the demise of “pure breed” humans. And yet in his other 
role, as protector and savior of his kin, Akin transforms this discourse of 
death into one of life. In fact, the literal meaning of Akin’s name synthe-
sizes these two meanings: “It means hero. If you put an s on it, it means 
brave boy. I’m the first boy born to a human woman on Earth since the 
war” (344). Thus Akin’s mission is spelled out and prefigured in his 
name like Christ, the first-born son of a human woman, meant to save 
mankind, meant to be a hero. Furthermore, the s, an additive to Akin’s 
name, pluralizes the kin indicating his dual origins, a literal illustration 
of the necessity of Akin to become someone brave and heroic on behalf 
of his kinsmen, his kinsfolk.
 This realization in Akin is not easy to come by. He is “frightened and 
miserable and shaking with anger” when he is a captive of the human 
resisters. Initially he is shocked at the “mix of intense emotions” till a 
chance remembrance dawns on him. He remembers Lilith’s anger, one 
that “had always frightened him, and yet here it was inside him” (321). 
As he strives to understand this very human emotion he remembers his 
mother’s words: 
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Human beings fear difference…. Humans persecute their dif-
ferent ones…. Oankali seek difference and collect it. They need 
it to keep themselves from stagnation and overspecialization….
You’ll probably find both tendencies surfacing in your own be-
havior…. When you feel a conflict, try to go the Oankali way. 
Embrace difference. (321)
A closed mind-frame, typical of resister humans, which breeds on fear 
and leads to persecution of the other, is rejected by Akin as he goes the 
Oankali way. He embraces “difference,” leading to a positive perspective 
that seeks to understand the other, the human part in him.
 His shock of realization indicates how disconnected Akin is with his 
human self. Human emotions are alien to him up to this point. And 
though he had recognized and seen it in others, he had never felt or 
understood it. Experiencing these emotions makes him realize the other 
inside him, the human part of himself. Despite his initial incomprehen-
sion of this new emotion (anger), Akin’s experience allows him later to 
empathize with the anger and hopelessness of the human resisters at 
Phoenix, as well as the fears and violent reactions that stem from these 
emotions. He comes very close to acting as a human, hoping that his 
captor and Tino’s (a human father figure to Akin) assailant, Damek, 
“would die … [and] suffer … [and] scream” when he lays injured (350). 
Though Akin restrains himself, the emotional turmoil later allows him 
to understand the sporadic irrationality of human behavior. Thus when 
Dehkiaht, his ooloi, tells him that humans would not survive their self-
destructive instincts if they were not genetically modified to purge the 
“Contradiction”—Akin replies, “[L]et them fail. Let them have the free-
dom to do that, at least” (456).
 Akin’s first taste and experience of death also comes at the hands of 
humans. Not only does he experience the death of one of the captors 
who mistreated him, he also witnesses the death of Iriarte who was kind 
to him. On both occasions, Akin feels a deep sense of unnecessary loss 
as he muses: “It was wrong to allow such suffering, utterly wrong to throw 
away a life so unfinished, unbalanced, unshared” (319). Akin’s knowl-
edge and understanding of death is essential for they awaken his desire 
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to save and empathize with humans, an empathy that engenders a recip-
rocal feeling in him despite the Phoenix humans being his abductors: 
“Akin tried not to feel the anguish that came to him reflexively when 
he saw a Human suffering” (350). The pain he feels generates the wish 
to alleviate it and forces him to question why humans choose death 
and reject the Oankali option of genetic healing. More importantly, the 
suffering and death that humans choose to endure eventually provides 
Akin the impetus to understand how vital the right to reproduce is for 
humans. In fact, it is here that the dream of a human future is born—a 
future “somewhere,” as Tate puts it, “we could live, and … have chil-
dren” (399); a hope made so much more compelling by a beckoning of 
freedom, the freedom to go back to a state of being before the Oankali 
intervention.
 Embedded in Akin’s mind is another hope too, a hope to connect to 
his Oankali counterpart, his sibling, a connection essential for attaining 
maturity and growth in the Oankali world. Interestingly, another name 
for Akin is “Eka.” The Sanskrit meaning of the word evokes a sense of 
loneliness and alienation that haunts Akin. The saga of Akin is a story 
of desired bonding, a bonding with the “other,” to alleviate his loneli-
ness, to set up familial bonding through his knowledge not only of the 
Oankali part of him but also of the human part of his identity. Akin in 
the arms of the human Tate, presents a tangible image and gives form 
and voice to the intangible sadness, an engulfing sense of seclusion and 
alienation that seek to overwhelm him. The lonesome sigh that escapes 
Akin, on a more wistful note, brings forth his desire: “I want to know 
the Human part of myself better” (398).
 An integral part of Akin’s rite of passage involves his coming into 
knowledge—getting to know the human part of himself. As a captive 
in Phoenix, Akin learns more about his “alien Humanity” even as he 
listens to the human complaint: “We die and die and no one is born” 
(438,347). The wistful sense of regret needs to be read critically though, 
given the novel’s critique of humanity. Similarly Akin’s bonding with 
the human Tate and Gabe, a quick replacement for what was to have 
been the Oankali way of bonding with his sibling, needs to be seen 
in perspective. Though it makes Akin’s connection with the humans 
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even stronger, as if they were his sibling, one cannot ignore Nikanj’s 
ejaculation: “The people deprived Akin of closeness with his sibling and 
handed him a compensating obsession” (417). In fact, “[a]nything to do 
with Humans always seems to involve contradictions” (418). And yet it 
starts him off in his mission: “that Humans should be permitted … their 
own hedge against disaster and true extinction … and their ability to 
reproduce in their own way restored to them” (395). It also makes him 
desperately seek a spokesperson in the Oankali fold for the humans until 
his ability to find one appropriate for the cause makes him realize that 
he is the ideal candidate: “He was Oankali enough to be listened to by 
other Oankali and Human enough to know that resister Humans were 
being treated with cruelty and condescension” (396).
 As Akin responds to human suffering and grief, he becomes a type of 
Christ,20 a savior for humanity. In fact, Akin comes face to face with his 
archetype, Christ, when he enters the salvage site at Phoenix. Images of 
Christ are prolific and scattered throughout the site. That the salvagers 
collect images of Christ indicates their desire to be saved from total ex-
tinction. Akin’s presence at the site is importunate. As he enters the house,
Tate, who had reached the house before him, took one of the 
moving pictures—a small one of Christ standing on a hill and 
talking to people—and handed it to Akin. He moved it slight-
ly in his hand, watching the apparent movement of Christ, 
whose mouth opened and closed and whose arm moved up 
and down.… He tasted it—then threw it hard away from him, 
disgusted, nauseated. (380)
Tate’s act of handing a picture of Christ to Akin seems to induct him 
into the vortex of the human desire to survive. The picture, interestingly, 
is one of “Christ standing on a hill and talking to people” that presages 
Akin’s role as the one to convince the Oankali to give the humans an-
other chance (380). The silent communication—“Christ, whose mouth 
opened and closed … Akin did not understand”—indicates a transfer-
ence of the mantle of the savior, followed by a deeper understanding of 
the pain and suffering of Christ, a suffering Akin must endure in his 
attempt to save the “Humans and … the Human part of” him (380, 
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447). Though his nausea and sickness are a reaction to the poison in the 
picture’s plastic, subtextually, readers can also perceive his reaction as a 
response to the knowledge of, or more specifically, to knowing and tast-
ing Christ’s suffering in an immediate and tangible way, as Akin attains 
knowledge and experiences through his mouth. His tasting the picture 
then, as well as his reaction afterwards, illustrates a very significant 
aspect of Akin—the literal and metaphorical act of tasting collapsed 
for him. He acquires knowledge literally through tasting, through using 
his tongue to collect, comprehend, and communicate information the 
Oankali way. In this instance, Butler through Akin, as she had done 
with Anyanwu in Wild Seeds, challenges the mind/body divide in any 
epistemological discourse “suggesting that corporeality, like culture, is 
coded and bodies, not just minds, have the power to interpret these 
codes” (Alaimo 128). Using a variant on the Biblical metaphor of eating 
the forbidden fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, Butler literally transforms 
the “tasting” of knowledge in the Bible, noted as the cause of fall and 
death, to a necessary means of life and restoration. 
 In a direct reversal of the failure of Adam and Eve, Akin uses the 
knowledge he acquires to connect with the resisters—to understand and 
bear their condition and affliction—and then to transmit this experi-
ence, as well as his own personal turmoil from this experience, directly to 
some individuals, such as Dehkiaht and Tiikuchahk—“[t]hen, carefully, 
in the manner of a storyteller, he gave it the experience of his own abduc-
tion, captivity, and conversion[and] made [Dehkiaht and Tiikuchahk] 
understand on an utterly personal level what he had suffered and what 
he had come to believe” (456). The same experience Akin conveys or-
ganically to all the residents of Chkahichdahk through Akjai:
The Akjai spoke to the people for Akin. Akin had not real-
ized it would do this—an Akjai ooloi telling other Oankali 
that there must be Akjai Humans. It spoke through the ship 
and had the ship signal the trade villages on Earth. It asked 
for a consensus and then showed the Oankali and construct 
people of Chkahichdahk what Akin had shown Dehkiaht and 
Tiikuchahk. (457)
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What Akin and the humans suffered at Phoenix as well as what Akin 
had learned there about humans—their dreams, their hopes, and their 
fears—reflexively becomes the experience of everyone at Chkahichdahk, 
not simply a story told about the experience of the “other.” For a 
moment, the human experience becomes the experience of all—made 
known to all, Oankali and constructs alike, through experience. Akin 
teaches Akjai and others that they “should at least know [the human 
resisters] before [they] deny them the assurance that Oankali always 
claim for themselves” (456). Thus Akin’s own experience of knowing his 
“other” is passed on, like a story is passed on, to augment the Oankali 
vision with that of a human’s, breaking the binary and self-containing 
message of the Human Contradiction: “Perhaps next time their intel-
ligence would be in balance with their hierarchical behavior, and they 
would not destroy themselves” (455). His mission becomes to give “life 
to a dead world,” to restore life on a new planet for the resisters, an un-
tampered life, the one they had before Oankali intervention. 
 The task demands total physical and mental investment from Akin. 
As he transmits his story to the Oankali Akjai, he perceives through the 
latter. The trajectory of exchange depends on mutuality and adjustment 
to the pace of the relay, “drawing back whenever the transmission [gets] 
too fast or too intense” (457). Perceptions of closure, of “people … turn-
ing away” make Akin “communicate his confusion” to the Akjai (457, 
458). Momentary insularity, as the Akjai fails to notice Akin’s “wordless 
questioning” (458), gives way to paving the path for Akin directly to 
“broadcast his bewilderment, letting people know they were experienc-
ing the emotions of a construct child—a child too Human to understand 
their reactions naturally. A child too Oankali and too near adulthood to 
disregard” (458). The whole process of communication draws heavily on 
Maurice Blanchot’s discourse of proximity, one that calls for a blurring 
of identity, where the self and the other virtually merge. 
 It also requires mental agility, a quick uptake, improvisational in 
nature, to convince the Oankali to grant the humans their right and free-
dom, to “give us the tools we need, and … give the Humans the things 
they need. They’ll have a new world to settle …. He stopped. He could 
have gone on, but it was time to stop. If he had not said enough, shown 
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them enough, if he had not guessed accurately about the Human-born, 
he had failed” (458–59). The success of Akin’s mission lies in his art of 
convincing, his use of rhetoric and his sense of timing to make appro-
priate political decisions. Though resisted by many in Chkahichdahk, 
Akin’s story prompts “Human-born constructs to start to think, start 
to examine their Human heritage as they had not before” (459). Akin’s 
story awakens that human other that had been dormant and neglected, 
that had thus far only been perceived by the Oankali self. The bond that 
Akin creates with humans is one that the Akjai is able to translate in its 
bond with Akin, and the message received and given is significant and 
far-reaching, transforming the power discourse that stems from the lim-
iting and debilitating vision of the Human Contradiction to the profes-
sion of a sermon of hope and futurity: “All people who know what it is 
to end should be allowed to continue if they can continue” (459).
 The success of Akin’s mission depends equally on his ability to con-
vince the humans. “I came back to tell you,” Akin tells Tate, “I’d kept 
my promise to you. I don’t know if you and the others can accept what 
I have to offer, but it would mean restored fertility and … a place of 
your own” (472). His tentative brooking of the subject elicits a wide-
eyed response from Tate but a skeptical rebuttal—“Where!”—from her 
husband, Gabe. “‘Mars,’ [Akin] said simply…. The narrator continues: 
“He did not know what they might know about Mars, so he began to 
reassure them. ‘We can enable the planet to support Human life. We’ll 
start as soon as I am mature. The work has been given to me. No one else 
felt the need to do it as strongly as I did’” (473). Akin understands that 
he needs humans to trust him, to believe in the sincerity of his cause so 
that they may convince other human resisters. The point to be noted is 
that Akin’s potential to convince others depends not only on his status 
that straddles the human and Oankali worlds but also on his ability to 
maintain a flexible mind frame that refuses to be trapped in dualistically 
defined segregatory politics. Akin acknowledges the human and Oankali 
divide but inhabits the interim space, a Bhabhian “third space,”21 that 
borrows from both and retains the possibility of constant growth fuelled 
by the indeterminacy of the moment. Thus Akin in essence as well as 
in his success can only be defined by the “plasticity” of his being (Goss 
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and Riquelme 441), a “plasticity” determined and molded by a constant 
inflow of information, the equivalent of the Derridean “différance,” that 
makes for meaning. 
 Adulthood Rites ends with the burning of Phoenix, and Akin’s meta-
morphosis. Both are indicative, more precisely, reflective of the impend-
ing state of change and rebirth. Phoenix lies in flames, while Akin, in 
a sense, rises out of the fire—out of his metamorphosis—into his new, 
external self. Akin as an Oankali, in the body of an Oankali, starts off on 
his mission to save humanity as he and the resisters begin their journey 
away from their old home to their new world. The physical image of 
Akin as he transforms into his new body slung on the shoulders of the 
human Gabe, “watch[ing] as the others fell in, single file” emphasizes 
the hope of a symbiotic relationship between the two species (504). The 
humans are as necessary to Akin as Akin is to the humans. It is here that 
Akin re-writes22 the ideals of a Biblical/Christian rendering of Christ 
as the savior of sinners; one who has come “[not] to call the righteous, 
but sinners to repentance” (Luke 5.31–32). In his posthuman manifes-
tation, Akin has the power to heal and guide the human resisters to a 
new, more purposeful life, but he is also dependent on the humans for a 
purpose and mission in his own life. 
 By leaving readers with this last—and lasting—image of difference 
as coming together, of difference as augmenting and transforming the 
essence of the “other,” transvaluation becomes a dynamic state of de-
pendency that in its fluid condition not only draws on both states of 
being but keeps changing as the need arises. It is this fluctuating live 
intent, a continuum kept alive by deferred possibilities, that keeps the 
posthuman other alive as one looks forward to the ultimate posthuman 
construct, Jodahs in Imago. Jodahs, the ooloi construct, goes beyond 
Akin in retaining a permanent instability and deferred context. Refusing 
gender categorization, a typical ooloi trait, Jodahs goes on to augment 
its genetically engineered construct identity with organically proliferant 
possibilities (Goss and Riquelme 443). As it implants a seed extracted 
from its body “deep in the rich soil of the riverbank,” Jodahs keeps the 
promise of freedom alive: “Seconds after I had expelled [the seed], I 
felt it begin the tiny positioning movements of independent life” (726). 
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The promise of proliferating new life emanates from the “third space 
of enunciation, which makes the structure of meaning and reference 
an ambivalent process” (Bhabha 37). In this space of ambivalence is 
born a discourse that acknowledges the exploitative nature of colonial 
control in all its nuanced manifestations and moves on to seek a redress 
by redirecting it to create a new world in another planet, a world of 
possibilities, of complexities that admits a past but promises a future of 
regenerative hope. 
Notes
 1 See Bukatman, Latour, Fukuyama, Halberstam, and Livingstone.
 2 For discussions on the posthuman as a state of “difference” that exists in the hu-
man, see Badmington, Hayles, and Rutsky.
 3 See Butler, Xenogenesis, a trilogy comprised of Dawn, Adulthood Rites, and Imago. 
 4 Critics differ in their analysis of the Oankali aliens and their motives. While 
Jacobs reads “a less absolutist, more relational way of being and acting in the 
world” (109), Zaki sees a fascist intention behind the Oankali maneuvers.
 5 Bhabha in Location describes the mimic man as the “reformed, recognizable 
other, as a subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite … constructed 
around an ambivalence; in order to be effective, mimicry must continually pro-
duce its slippage, its excess, its difference” (86). This “disciplinary double … does 
not merely ‘rupture’ the discourse, but becomes transformed into an uncertainty 
which fixes the colonial subject as a ‘partial’ presence … ‘incomplete’ and ‘vir-
tual’” (86).
 6 See Simon 2 and Didur 101.
 7 See Jacobs and Tucker.
 8 Holden also calls them “imperialistic colonizers” whose desire to embrace dif-
ference is a possible tactic for “consumption of difference” (51). Yet, as Holden 
points out, there are mitigating traits of the Oankali as “they do not understand 
competition or war … have a special reverence for anything living … [and] are 
attracted to difference” (51).
 9 See in this context the concept of the rhizome as explicated by Deleuze and 
Guattari in Anti-Oedipus.
 10 Identity-in-the-making is my variant on Minh-ha’s “subject-in-the-making” 
(102) that draws on the concept of the Derridean “différance.” Hall in “Cultural 
Identity and Diaspora” explains: “to capture this sense of difference which is not 
pure ‘otherness’, we need to deploy the play on words of a theorist like Jacques 
Derrida. Derrida uses the anomalous ‘a’ in his way of writing ‘difference’—dif-
férance—a marker which sets up a disturbance in our settled understanding or 
translation of the word concept. It sets the word in motion to new meanings 
132
Apa r a j i t a  Nanda
without erasing the trace of its other meanings …. [It] challenges the fixed bina-
ries which stabilize meaning and representation and show how meaning is never 
finished or completed, but keeps on moving to encompass other additional or 
supplementary meanings … what is then constituted within representation is 
always open to being deferred, staggered, serialized” (115).
 11 Refer to Haraway’s Simians and Modest Witness.
 12 Warwick in I, Cyborg discusses the enhancement of human physical and mental 
attributes by way of genetic modifications. This posthuman condition has been 
acknowledged as “a new phase of human evolution” in which human choice 
plays an important role.
 13 Gilbert in her article on Manjula Padmanabhan’s Harvest makes a similar point 
about Jeetu, a bio-technologically transmuted man.
 14 I am indebted to Elaine Graham for this idea. Refer to Noble, qtd. in Graham, 
“Post/Human Conditions” 23.
 15 The American Heritage Dictionary defines “xenogenesis” as the supposed pro-
duction of offspring markedly different from either parent.
 16 Osherow points out that “Lilith’s position as enabler was thrust upon her by her 
captors,” typically, I think, in the ways the colonizers groomed a native in their 
mold and mind frame to create a “mimic man.”
 17 Goss and Riquelme in “From Superhuman to Posthuman” compare Fanon’s po-
sition of the native intellectual in “On National Culture” to that of Lilith (450). 
The initial assimilative period, according to Fanon, is replaced later by a rejection 
of the dominant culture. Lilith’s behavior resembles that of “a colonial subject.” 
In order to survive the alien oppression, Lilith advises humans to “Learn and 
run,” that is to “take what they need to know from the Oankali in order to escape 
their dominance.”
 18 Stoler points out “European manhood in the colonies, whether measured by 
‘character’ and civility or by position and class, was largely independent of the 
presence of European women” (1), as European women often followed men 
much later. The women came to the colonies only after the place was declared 
“politically, medically and physically ‘safe’” (2). Among other reasons the sheer 
absence of European women often led to relationships between European men 
and colored women. Ackerman recalls Jesser’s point that “the sexual biology in 
Butler’s story is remarkably fixed” as she comments on the fact that Butler’s 
“narrative never presents an erotic scene with an ooloi and two individuals of 
the same sex/gender.” To Ackerman’s observation that “part of the emphasis on 
heterosexual sex can be due to the trilogy’s broader focus on biological reproduc-
tion” ( 39), I would like to add the colonial support for heterosexual unions, 
where even illegitimate relations were condoned to counter what Stoller calls 
the “more dangerous … carnal relations between men and men” (2). Vint talks 
about the “anxiety about homosexuality [as] one of the key triggers for the anti-
Oankali response on the part of Resister humans” (73), which problematizes 
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any easy polarizing of the Oankalis as colonizers and the humans as colonized. 
Constantly playing within the narrative, in its depiction of both the Oankalis 
and the humans, is an inherent ambivalence that refuses categorization and 
threatens constant slippages.
 19 My connotation of the term borrows from Stoler’s comment that “in histories 
situated on the peripheries of empire … [where] ‘whiteness’ was a palpable ob-
session, the crafting of chromatic identities has long been a troubled subject” 
(13).
 20 Lee mentions that though Akin like Christ mirrors a “dual” nature (Akin’s 
Human/Oankali and Christ’s Human/Divine) the duality, with its hierarchical 
divides, is breeched in Akin by a relatedness that builds on reciprocity between 
the human and the alien Oankali as it makes a bid for immortality. 
 21 For Bhabha “the non-synchronous temporality of global and national cultures 
opens up a cultural space—a third space—where the negotiation of incommen-
surable differences creates a tension peculiar to borderline existences…. Hybrid 
hyphenations emphasize the incommensurable elements as the basis of cultural 
identities” (218).
 22 Peppers points out that Xenogenesis is a “cyborg” origin story. It plays with 
minimal origin stories of the West—the Biblical, sociobiological, paleoanthro-
pological—only to re-write them “from within, using the very power of these 
discourses to help us imagine the origins of human identity in other ways” (49). 
This re-writing, even as it creates “xenophilia in place of xenophobia” (60), also, I 
feel, continues the tradition of the typical post-colonial “resistance” writing as it 
appropriates established Western tropes or narratives to interpolate them with its 
own discourse, establishing a form by which, to borrow the title of Bill Ashcroft, 
Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin’s book, “the empire writes back.”
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